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I. INTRODUCTION

The preliminary injunction is an extraordinarily powerful
remedy. After only an initial hearing, a court can command the
nonmovant to perform-or to refrain from performing-an action,
enforceable by criminal contempt.1 This supposedly temporary form of
relief is often, in practical terms, dispositive of the case because the
preliminary injunction remains in effect unless and until a subsequent

decision vacates

it.2

1.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); Morton Denlow, The Motion for a PreliminaryInjunction: Time for
a Uniform FederalStandard,22 REV. LITIG. 495, 498-99 (2003).
2.
See John Castles III, Interlocutory Injunctions in Flux: A Plea for Uniformity, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1359, 1359 (1979) (explaining that the power to enjoin a corporate transaction temporarily
is effectively a final decision); Denlow, supra note 1, at 532 (arguing that a case may essentially
be over once a preliminary injunction issues because the parties may not be able to afford two
rounds of trials or the event at issue may be resolved before a trial on the merits can be held);
Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standardfor PreliminaryInjunctions, 68 OR.
L. REV. 839, 852 (1989) (arguing that the backlog of federal civil cases encourages parties to use
the preliminary injunction as a way to obtain a hearing on their case quickly); Arthur D. Wolf,
Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 231-32 (1984)
(arguing that in evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits, appellate courts often discuss
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A few examples illustrate the power of the preliminary
injunction. Two recent, high-profile preliminary injunctions involved
controversial state legislation addressing the issue of illegal
immigration. In April 2010, the Arizona legislature passed, and
Governor Jan Brewer signed, Senate Bill 1070 ("S.B. 1070"), the
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. 3 The
federal government sought a preliminary injunction to restrain
Arizona from enforcing portions of S.B. 1070, on the grounds that
federal immigration law preempted S.B. 1070. 4 Judge Susan Bolton of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted in part and
denied in part the motion for a preliminary injunction.5 She issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining portions of sections 2, 3, 5, and 6 of
S.B. 1070, which: require police officers to make reasonable attempts
to determine a person's immigration status when the officers have a
reasonable suspicion that the person they stopped, detained, or
arrested is unlawfully in the United States; make it a crime for an
immigrant to fail to apply for or carry alien registration papers; make
it a crime for an unauthorized alien to solicit, apply for, or perform
work; and authorize police officers to make warrantless arrests where
they have probable cause to believe that the person has committed an
offense that makes the person removable from the United States.6 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decision.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December
12, 2011; the preliminary injunction will remain in effect until the
8
Supreme Court issues a decision.
Similarly, in June 2011, the Alabama legislature passed, and
Governor Robert Bentley signed, House Bill 56 ("H.B. 56"), the
Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,
which also seeks to discourage illegal immigration.9 The majority of its
provisions were scheduled to become effective on September 1, 2011,
but Judge Sharon Blackburn of the U.S. District Court for the
the merits so thoroughly that it is unlikely that on remand the trial court would decide the
merits differently than the appellate court).
3.
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. 2011).
4.
Id. at 986.
5.
Id. at 987.
6.
Id.
7.
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-182,
2011 WL 3556224, at *1 (Dec. 12, 2011).
8.
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 2011 WL 3556224, at *1 (Dec. 12, 2011) (order
granting petition for writ of certiorari).
9.
United States v. State, No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 28, 2011).
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Northern District of Alabama temporarily restrained their
enforcement until September 29, 2011.10 On September 28, 2011,
Judge Blackburn granted in part and denied in part the United States'
and the private plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of portions of H.B. 56 on the basis of federal
preemption.1 1 Judge Blackburn issued a preliminary injunction
preventing sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17 from taking effect. 12 These
sections make it a crime for an unauthorized alien to apply for, solicit,
or perform work; make it a crime to harbor or transport an
unauthorized alien or encourage an unauthorized alien to come to
Alabama; forbid employers from claiming as tax deductions any wages
paid to unauthorized aliens; and establish a civil cause of action
against an employer who fails to hire or discharges a U.S. citizen or a
3
legal alien while hiring or retaining an unauthorized alien.'
Preliminary injunctions are by no means used only to enjoin
enforcement of legislation, however. Movants seek preliminary
15
14
injunctions in a wide variety of areas, including trademark, patent,
securities, 16 and environmental law. 17 Yet federal courts wield this
formidable remedy without a uniform set of standards. The federal
courts generally agree that they should consider four factors when
ruling on a preliminary injunction: (1) the threat of irreparable harm
to the movant if the court denies the preliminary injunction; (2) the
balance between this irreparable harm and the harm the court would
inflict on the nonmovant by granting the injunction; (3) the probability
that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the effect of the

10.
11.

Id.
Id. at * 2.

12. Id.
13. Id. at *1-2. The United States and private plaintiffs also sought an injunction pending
appeal of the six sections of H.B. 56 not enjoined by the district court. United States v. Alabama,
No. 11-14532-CC, 2011 WL 4863957, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011). The Eleventh Circuit
granted in part and denied in part the motion, and enjoined Alabama from enforcing Sections 10
and 28 of H.B. 56. Id. at *6.
14. Corr. Officers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Palmieri, No. 11 Civ. 7664(LAK), 2012 WL 279484,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012).
15. See, e.g., Jack Guttman, Inc. v. KopyKake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1362-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (vacating the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanding the
case for consideration of irreparable harm and balance of the hardships).
16. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 419 (N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 75 (1987).
17. Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 780 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court's
denial of preliminary injunction and remanding for entry of preliminary injunction), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008).
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court's decision on the public interest.' 8 Although courts usually
examine these four traditional factors, they differ in how they
characterize and apply the factors. 19 Some federal circuits require a
movant to establish each of the four factors independently using a
"sequential" test. 20 Other circuits examine all four factors, but
evaluate them using an overall "balancing" test.21 Still other circuits
use a hybrid of these two approaches, requiring a movant to establish
one or two of the factors and then balancing the remaining factors
under a "threshold" test.22 In this Note, the term "sliding scale"
encompasses both balancing and threshold tests.
The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to
enunciate a uniform federal standard for preliminary injunctions but
has repeatedly declined to do so, instead addressing only the factor at
stake in the case. 23 While this approach may exemplify judicial
restraint, it has also left the lower federal courts to develop their own
diverging tests. The circuit courts' differing standards likely lead to
inconsistent judgments 24-raising fundamental fairness issues-and
25
may also encourage forum-shopping.

18. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2948 (2d ed. 1987).
19. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 509 (explaining that not all circuits require the
independent establishment of all four factors).
20. The Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and sometimes the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits take
this approach.
21. The Sixth, Eighth, D.C., and sometimes the Tenth Circuits take this approach.
22. The First, Second, Seventh, and sometimes the Third and Ninth Circuits take this
approach.
23. E.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 33233 (1999) (declining to weigh arguments in favor or against issuing a preliminary injunction in
this context and finding that because the remedy at issue was historically unavailable in equity,
the district court lacked authority to issue the preliminary injunction); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321, 328-31 (1944) (stressing the flexibility of courts' equity powers while finding that the
statute did not mandate issuance of an injunction and remanding to the circuit court to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint).
24. See Vaughn, supra note 2, at 840 (arguing that courts' use of different standards affects
the outcome of cases, leading to inconsistency and confusion).
25. For instance, in Center for Biological Diversity v. Rural Utilities Service, No. C-08-1240
MMC, 2008 WL 2622868, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2008), the district court granted defendants'
motion to transfer the case from the Northern District of California to the Eastern District of
Kentucky, where the operative facts actually occurred. The judge commented, "Significantly,
plaintiffs cite no public factor that weighs in favor of retention of the action in this District." Id.
This suggests that one reason, and perhaps the only reason, the plaintiffs filed in California was
the Ninth Circuit's more permissive preliminary injunction standard, although they could not
assert that as a legitimate reason for keeping the case in California. The liberal venue provisions
governing federal suits allow a plaintiff considerable latitude to bring a case in a jurisdiction
with a more plaintiff-friendly preliminary injunction standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011).
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Three recent Supreme Court decisions provide new clues as to
which preliminary injunction test the Court prefers and have opened a
split in the circuit courts regarding whether these decisions foreclose
sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests. In Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court struck down part of the
Ninth Circuit's preliminary injunction test, which had allowed the
movant the chance to prevail by showing only a "possibility" of
irreparable harm if he also demonstrated a strong likelihood of
prevailing on the merits. 26 The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must always show that irreparable
harm is "likely," not merely "possible."27 It enunciated the preliminary
injunction test as follows: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
in the public interest."28 The Supreme Court briefly addressed the
success-on-the-merits factor in two other recent cases, Munaf v. Geren
and Nken v. Holder, which are discussed at length in Part III.
The circuits have split regarding how to interpret Winter,
Munaf, and Nken. These cases are most significant for those circuits
that used balancing or threshold tests prior to Winter, because
Winter's plain language points to a sequential test. The Fourth Circuit
has held that Winter invalidated its longstanding threshold test and
instead required that a movant establish each of the four traditional
factors (that is, a sequential test).29 The Second and Seventh Circuits,
however, have held that their own sliding-scale tests remain viable
after Winter. In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., the Second Circuit noted that
Munaf, Winter, and Nken "have not undermined [the Supreme
Court's] approval of the more flexible approach" and that "[n]one of
the three cases comments at all, much less negatively, upon the
application of a preliminary injunction standard that softens a strict

'likelihood' [of success] requirement in cases that warrant

it."30

In

Judge v. Quinn, after reciting Winter's test, the Seventh Circuit
commented, "These considerations are interdependent: the greater the
26. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21-22 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
30. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010).
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likelihood of success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction
31
must prevent in order for preliminary relief to be warranted."
The Ninth Circuit, whose irreparable-harm formulation Winter
overruled, has developed an intracircuit split over whether Winter
requires a sequential test or leaves room for a modified sliding-scale
test. In DISH Network Corp. v.Federal Communications Commission,
the Ninth Circuit held that Winter requires a movant to "demonstrate
that it meets all four of the elements of the preliminary injunction
test."32 But in Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, a different
Ninth Circuit panel held that a movant could prevail by showing only
"serious questions going to the merits," rather than a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, so long as he also showed irreparable harm,
that the injunction was in the public interest, and that the balance of
33
the hardships tipped sharply toward him.
This Note discusses whether sliding-scale preliminary
injunction tests can-and should-survive Winter, Munaf, and Nken.
Part II provides a brief history of preliminary injunctions, including
their origin in the English Courts of Chancery and their development
in the United States. Part III supplies additional context for the
Winter, Munaf, and Nken decisions. Part IV examines the circuit
courts' differing interpretations of these cases' effect on their slidingscale tests. Part V proposes that the Supreme Court adopt in clear
terms the sequential test it stated in Winter, but allow courts to use
the Ninth Circuit's Alliance serious-questions test in a few narrow,
compelling circumstances.

II. A BRIEF

HISTORY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

An injunction is a court order that commands the nonmovant
to do or to refrain from doing a particular action. 34 Federal courts
issue three basic types of injunctions: temporary restraining orders
("TROs"), preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions. 35 A
TRO is usually sought and granted on an ex parte basis and operates
to prevent immediate irreparable harm until the court can hold a

31. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010).
32. DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 2011).
33. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010), reh'g
denied, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (withdrawing and replacing prior opinion on denial of
rehearing en banc).
34.

WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN

EQUITY 11 (1871).

35.

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2941.
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preliminary injunction hearing. 36 It is available for a maximum of
fourteen days, although a court may, for good cause, extend it for
another fourteen days. 37 In contrast, courts issue a preliminary
injunction following notice to the nonmoving party and after a hearing
and argument, and it is effective until superseded by a decision on the
merits. 38 Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion.3 9 Although courts and commentators
have offered several rationales, the basic purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to protect the movant from irreparable injury that would
occur before a full trial took place, absent the injunction. 40 In other
words, a preliminary injunction attempts to protect the court's ability
41
to render a meaningful decision on the merits following a full trial.
Courts issue a permanent injunction only after a full trial on the
merits. 42 This Note focuses exclusively on preliminary injunctions.
This Part briefly examines the historical development of preliminary
injunctions from eighteenth-century England to the present day.
A. From England to America
The creature we now recognize as a preliminary injunction
evolved, like so much of American jurisprudence, from English origins.
A preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy derived from the
system of remedies administered by the English Court of Chancery at
the time the United States gained its independence. 43 The Court of
Chancery developed in England as the chancellor, a high minister of
the king, regularized the procedure for evaluating petitions for the
king's personal justice. 44 Chancery could provide plaintiffs with
remedies not available in the common law courts, which were limited
to providing damages. 45 Yet, there were objections to chancery;

36.

FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2941.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
(1999).

FED. R. CIv. P. 65(b)(2).
Id. at 65(a)(1); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2941.
Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973).
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2947.
Id.
Id. at § 2941.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318

44.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 19 (1991) (citing

historical sources); see Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The
Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1997) (discussing the origins of the
equity system and the role of chancery courts).
45. Denlow, supra note 1, at 500.
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common law judges wanted to preserve their authority, and
46
individuals doubted a court system tied to the power of the king.
Consequently, chancery developed a rule whereby a movant could
obtain equitable relief only if he could show he had no adequate
47
remedy at law (called the "adequacy doctrine").
Uniform standards for preliminary injunctions across different
areas of the law did not develop in England until the nineteenth
century. 48 These standards were a response to the rising demand for
injunctions, the need to maintain consistency among the chancery
judges, the trend toward systematizing legal rules, and the continuing
desire to cabin equity's discretion. 49 As part of this growing
systematization, chancery became increasingly open to granting
preliminary injunctions to movants whose legal rights were not
absolutely clear after an initial hearing. 50 This greater receptivity to
granting interim relief was largely due to chancery's reluctance to
reach a final decision on the merits without a full trial, although it
also had its origins in chancery's historic unwillingness to rule on
common law rights. 51 As Francis Hilliard stated in his 1865 treatise,
"The object of a preliminary injunction is to prevent some threatening
irreparable mischief, until an opportunity for a full and deliberate
investigation." 52 Chancery therefore began to predict the likelihood
that the movant would eventually succeed on the merits, rather than
assessing the merits at the initial hearing. 53 As William Kerr noted in
his 1867 treatise on equity:
In interfering by interlocutory injunction, the Court does not in general profess to
anticipate the determination of the right, but merely gives it as its opinion that there is
a substantial question to be tried .... It is enough if he [the movant] can show that he
has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right which he alleges, and can

46. LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 19-20.
47. FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 23, at 15-17 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bros.
1865); KERR, supra note 34, at 3; 1 THOMAS CARL SPELLING, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF IN EQUITY AND AT LAW § 4, at 4 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1893).

48. See John Leubsdorf, The Standard for PreliminaryInjunctions, 91 HARv. L. REV. 525,
527, 532 (1978) ("The idea that there should be a single standard for all preliminary injunction
cases emerged in nineteenth-century England.").
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 533 ("The rationale for predicting the strength of the plaintiffs case rather
than adjudicating it on the spot showed signs of shifting from a reluctance to pass on common
law rights to an unwillingness to reach the merits without a full hearing.").
52. HILLIARD, supra note 47, § 9, at 7.
53. Leubsdorf, supranote 48, at 532-33.
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satisfy the Court that the property should
be preserved in its present actual condition,
54
until such question can be disposed of.

The notion of irreparable injury also began to take hold, and when
invoking it in the context of preliminary injunctions, judges started to
define it in a way that distinguished preliminary injunctions from
permanent injunctions. 55 This is an important modern-day distinction
as well: in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must
show that he would suffer an injury prior to obtaining a permanent
injunction that a permanent injunction would be insufficient to
56
remedy.
American colonial courts adopted the English system of
common law and chancery courts, as well as English equity
principles. 57 The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave American federal courts
jurisdiction over all suits in equity, 58 and the Supreme Court has held
that this jurisdiction is equivalent to "the jurisdiction in equity
exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original
Judiciary Act. '' 59 During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
also held that courts should look to English equity law when no
American precedent existed on a particular subject. 60 Wary of the
equitable powers of the federal courts, Congress has since passed
numerous statutes prohibiting courts from issuing certain types of

54. KERR, supra note 34, at 12.
55. Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 533-34.
56. LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 113 ("[Ihe only injury that counts is injury that cannot be
prevented after a more complete hearing at the next state of the litigation."). For instance, in
Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), the movants argued that
"without preliminary injunctive relief, mining at Spruce Fork will bury a living stream and a
forested hollow, permanently destroying the indigenous wildlife and flora as well as the unique
topography of this portion of southern West Virginia." A permanent injunction would come too
late to prevent this harm.
57. LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 21; Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 538 ("Lacking both
coherent native analysis and the stream of diverse cases that fostered the evolution of the law in
England, many authorities sought to follow the English precedents and treatises.").
58. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
59. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999) (quoting ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
660 (1928)).
60. Cf. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1881) (stating that U.S. Courts of Appeals are
governed by federal rules of equity, and "when these are silent, by the practice of the High Court
of Chancery in England prevailing when the equity rules were adopted, so far as the same may
reasonably be applied"); 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §
5002 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that Equity Rule 33 provided that for those matters not covered by
the equity rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1822, the circuit courts shall be regulated
by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England).
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injunctions.61 For instance, the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 bars
federal courts from issuing injunctions to stay proceedings in state
courts "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
62
judgments."
In 1938, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
63
Procedure, the dual American systems of law and equity merged.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 specifies the procedural
mechanisms for obtaining injunctive relief, it does not provide any
substantive criteria for federal courts to apply in evaluating a
movant's request for injunctive relief.64 Therefore, federal courts
continue to apply the principles adopted from English chancery and
developed in American courts when exercising their equitable
discretion. 65 These principles have coalesced into the four traditional
factors mentioned in Part I: (1) likelihood of irreparable harm, (2)
likelihood of success on the merits, (3) balance of the hardships, and
(4) public interest. 66 Although nearly all federal courts examine these
factors, the courts differ in the way they describe the factors and in
67
the weight they give each factor.
B. EquitablePrinciples
Judges frequently invoke equitable principles to explain their
decisions to grant or deny a 'preliminary injunction. The first principle,
stated in nearly every case involving a preliminary injunction, is that
an injunction is an "extraordinary" remedy, 68 "not a remedy which
61.

KIRSTEN STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS

AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 5 (2009). Other examples of anti-injunction statutes include the
Tax Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006)), the Tax
Injunction Act of 1937 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)), the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932 (29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)), and the Johnson Act of 1934 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(2008)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
63. STOLL-DEBELL ETAL., supra note 61, at 5.
64. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (stating procedures for obtaining injunctions and
restraining orders). Prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the court must give notice
to the nonmoving party, and the moving party must post bond. Id. at 65(a)(1), 65(c).
65. Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322
(1999) (reversing the district court for providing a type of injunctive relief that was not
historically available in equity).
66. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supranote 61, at 5-6.
67. Id.
68. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2942 ("[A]n injunction is regarded as an
extraordinary remedy."); City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338
(1933) (discussing how a court may deny equitable relief even when it has found that one party
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issues as of course."69 This notion is derived from equity's origins as an
alternative to the common law courts and from the guiding principle
that equity could only be invoked if a plaintiff had no adequate
remedy at law. 70 Now that law and equity have merged, the grant of a
preliminary injunction is "less dependent on a showing that the legal
remedy is inadequate," but courts continue to repeat this phrase. 71
The notion of an injunction as an extraordinary remedy still serves to
emphasize the idea that movants must make a strong showing on the
four traditional factors in order for the court to grant a preliminary
injunction. It also alludes to the notion that the successful movant
must show that his injury cannot be remedied by a permanent
injunction-because otherwise, there would be no need for a
preliminary injunction. 72 Finally, a preliminary injunction is
extraordinary because the court can alter the relative positions of the
parties, sometimes dramatically, without the movant clearly
establishing his entitlement to prevail on the merits.
Another equitable maxim is that courts issue preliminary
injunctions to preserve the status quo.7 3 Courts and commentators
began to identify the preservation of the status quo as one purpose of a
preliminary injunction during the nineteenth century. 74 Many modern
commentators view the early use of the notion of preserving the status
quo as merely describing the effect, not the purpose, of a preliminary

has committed a tort upon the other); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24 (2008) ("A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.").
69. City of Harrisonville,289 U.S. at 337-38; accord Winter, 555 U.S. at 32 ("An injunction
is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of
course." (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))); Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. at 311 (quoting City of Harrisonville, 289 U.S. at 337-38); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674, 689-90 (2008) (stating that a preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic
remedy" and that "it is never awarded as of right" (citing multiple sources)); Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is
an extraordinary and drastic remedy ... " (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2942));
HILLIARD, supra note 47, § 16, at 10 ("[P]laintiffs are bound to make out a case showing a clear
necessity for its exercise." (citing Auburn & Cato Plank Rd. Co. v. Douglass, 12 Barb. 553, 555
(1850), rev'd, 9 N.Y. 444 (1854))).
70. See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
71. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2941.
72. LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 113.
73. Cf. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 109, 110 (2001) ("One set of circuits says that the traditional role of such relief is the
preservation of the 'status quo,' ...... Another set of circuits rejects this view.").
74. Id. at 127-33.
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injunction 75 and criticize the calcification of this notion into a rule. 76
The Supreme Court has restated preservation of the status quo as
"preserv[ing] the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the
77
merits can be held."
Courts sometimes use the notion of preserving the status quo
to distinguish between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. When
courts differentiate between these two types of injunctions, they
typically do so in the course of stating that mandatory injunctions are
more difficult to obtain because they alter, rather than preserve, the
status quo.7 8 Yet mandatory injunctions are not always more
disruptive than prohibitory ones. 79 As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., whether a
mandatory or prohibitory injunction will preserve or alter the status
quo depends on whether the status quo is a "condition of action" or a
"condition of rest."8 0 Another way of saying this is that it all depends
on the point in time at which the court measures the status quo. For
example, if the action challenged is the granting of a federal permit
and if the status quo is measured prior to the granting of the permit,
then preserving the status quo favors the movant. If the status quo is
measured after the granting of the permit, however, then preserving
the status quo (that is, the right to engage in the permitted action)
favors the nonmovant.

75. Id. at 129-30 (noting that Kerr's treatise stated that interlocutory injunctions have the
effect and object of preserving the status quo, but arguing that "[tihere is no reason to infer that
Kerr meant to ascribe doctrinal significance to the status quo").
76. Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 546 ("Emphasis on preserving the status quo is a habit
without a reason. To freeze the existing situation may inflict irreparable injury on a plaintiff
deprived of his rights or a defendant denied the right to innovate. The status quo shibboleth
cannot be justified as a way to limit interlocutory judicial meddling, because a court interferes
just as much when it orders the status quo preserved as when it changes it. The test is not even
easy to apply, since it eddies off into conundrums about what status is decisive." (citations
omitted)).
77. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
78. See RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that
"mandatory preliminary injunctions are traditionally disfavored" (citing Schrier v. Univ. of Colo.,
427 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2005)); Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 535 ("Related to concern
with the status quo was the tendency ... to avoid preliminary injunctions that were 'mandatory'
rather than 'prohibitory.' ").
79. Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 535 ("Courts resisted mandatory relief when it would force
a defendant to make innovations. Talk about mandatory and prohibitory injunctions thus
reflected, however waveringly, the same reluctance to decree burdensome relief without a full
hearing that was pervading judicial thought on interlocutory remedies." (citations omitted)).
80. 746 F.2d 816, 830 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

1024

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 65:3:1011

Courts and legislatures8 1 have sometimes tipped the scales in
favor of preliminary injunctions-for instance, when courts presume
irreparable harm. Some circuits presume irreparable harm when the
movant can demonstrate a likelihood of success on a claim alleging
violation of constitutional rights.82 Commentators criticize courtformulated presumptions of irreparable harm as depriving the
nonmovant of his rights based only on a generalized assumption about
an entire category of cases.8 3 Recently, the Supreme Court appeared
receptive to these arguments. In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, the Court overturned the presumption of irreparable injury
whenever there is a violation of the National Environmental Policy
Act.8 4 Many courts used to automatically presume irreparable harm in
patent, trademark, and copyright infringement cases if the movant
showed a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim.8 5 However, in
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that this
86
presumption was invalid in the context of permanent injunctions.
Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have applied eBay to preliminary
injunctions, holding that a finding of likely success on the merits in a
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement case does not give rise to
a presumption of likely irreparable harm.8 7 Congress and state
legislatures can also tip the scales by enacting statutes that empower
or require courts to enter injunctive relief in certain circumstances.8 8

81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (2007) ("[U]se of specific trade secrets, customer lists, or
direct solicitation of existing customers shall be presumed to be an irreparable injury and may be
specifically enjoined.").
82. E.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d. Cir. 1996); see also Paulsen v. Cnty. of
Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the loss of First Amendment rights
"unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury" (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976))).
83. Cf.Leubsdorf, supra note 48, at 561-63 ('To enjoin on the basis of an irrebuttable
presumption of irreparable injury, without a full hearing or a decision that immediate relief is
actually essential, may forever deprive a defendant of rights Congress meant to leave him. It
may also violate the due process clause. . . . The statutory scheme can help identify and weigh
irreparable injuries. Sometimes, a rebuttable presumption of injury is appropriate.").
84. 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (2010).
85. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 61, at 6.
86. 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006) ("[Tlhis Court has consistently rejected invitations to
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows
a determination that a copyright has been infringed.").
87. E.g., Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011);
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010).
88. For instance, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act provides that a court "shall grant
a preliminary injunction" if.(1) a franchisee shows his franchise has been terminated or not
renewed, (2) "there exist sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make such
questions a fair ground for litigation," and (3) the court finds that the harm to the franchisor
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In these instances, traditional equitable factors have less weight, and
the court must grant the injunction if the movant satisfies the
statutory requirements, which often include some of the traditional
equitable factors.8 9
On the other hand, courts sometimes require movants to make
a heightened showing in order to obtain certain kinds of preliminary
injunctions. As noted previously, some circuits require a movant
seeking a mandatory injunction, or an injunction the court believes
alters the status quo, to make a higher showing of the four traditional
factors.90 Other circuits have rejected this bifurcated standard. 91
C. The Supreme Court's Hazy Holdings
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear preliminary
injunction test, preferring to address only the factor at issue in a
particular case, rather than how the factors fit together.9 2 The Court
has emphasized the importance of each of the four traditional factors
93
at some point and has endorsed a flexible approach in some cases
and a stricter approach 94 in others, so the panoply of federal standards
is an understandable result. Each circuit can find ample Supreme
Court text-often dicta-supporting its own preliminary injunction
test, simply because the precedent is so varied.
For example, in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, the Court appeared to
endorse a more generous, flexible standard:
Where the questions presented by an application for an interlocutory injunction are
grave, and the injury to the moving party will be certain and irreparable, if the
application be denied and the final decree be in his favor, while if the injunction be
granted the injury to the opposing party, even if the final decree be in his favor, will be

would be less than that to the franchisee if the preliminary injunction is granted. 15 U.S.C. §
2805(b)(2).
89. STOLL-DEBELL ETAL., supra note 61, at 9.
90. Id. at 8 ("[T]he Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits adjust the odds against mandatory
injunctions, which require a party to act or alter the status quo, by requiring a movant to make a
heightened showing of the factors that govern the grant of injunctive relief."); see, e.g., SCFC
ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring a movant seeking
a mandatory injunction to establish that the traditional factors weigh "heavily and compellingly"
in his favor).
91. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'I
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a heightened standard for injunctions
that alter the status quo in favor of a consistent focus on preventing injury).
92. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
93. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
94. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("[A] preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion." (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2948)).
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inconsiderable, or may be adequately indemnified by a bond, the injunction usually will
95
be granted.

Ohio Oil suggests that if the movant can show he will likely suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction and that
the preliminary injunction will cause only "inconsiderable" harm to
the nonmovant, then the injunction should be granted, even if the
movant can show only "grave" questions on the merits, rather than
likely success on the merits. The Second Circuit has interpreted Ohio
Oil as an implicit endorsement of a serious-questions test.96 The
Supreme Court also emphasized the importance of flexibility to equity
in Hecht Co. v. Bowles: "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it. '' 97 Hecht Co., however, addresses the Court's
flexibility in shaping the injunction to fit the circumstances of the
case, not flexibility in deciding whether to grant the injunction in the
first instance.
Circuit courts with stricter preliminary injunction tests can
also cite ample Supreme Court precedent supporting their approaches.
In Yakus v. United States, the Court indicated that irreparable injury
was necessary, but not sufficient, to obtain a preliminary injunction,
stating, "The award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity
has never been regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though
irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff. '98 In Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, however, the
Court held that the equitable powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of
1789 did not include the power to create remedies unknown to equity
jurisprudence at the time of the Act; the Court appeared to endorse a
more demanding conception of preliminary injunctions: "We do not
question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the federal
system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad
boundaries of traditional equitable relief."99 In Mazurek v. Armstrong,
the Court also emphasized the movant's high burden, particularly
with respect to showing likely success on the merits, quoting
approvingly from a Wright and Miller treatise: "[A] preliminary
95. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 814 (1929).
96. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2010); see supranotes 30-31 and accompanying text.
97. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329.
98. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
99. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322
(1999).
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injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not
be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden
of persuasion."' 100
As stated above, the Supreme Court has also emphasized the
significance of each of the four traditional factors. In Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., the Court stressed that the movant must show "he will
suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the
merits." 10 1 A few years later, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the
Court dropped its emphasis on success on the merits from its
articulation, stating, "[T]he basis for injunctive relief in the federal
courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal
remedies.' 0 2 Weinberger also emphasized the public interest: "In
exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction."1 0 3 These varied past decisions
opened the door to additional clarification from the Supreme Court,
whose recent cases on preliminary injunctions have been only
moderately illuminating.

III. WINTER, MUNAF, AND NKEN: WHAT THEY HELD AND WHAT THEY
LEFT UNRESOLVED

A. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: A Likelihood,
Not a Possibility,of IrreparableHarm
Among the trio of recent Supreme Court cases this Note
discusses, Winter is the case with the most significant implications for
sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests. In Winter, environmental
groups sought to enjoin the U.S. Navy from using midfrequency active
sonar in training exercises off the coast of southern California,
claiming that the sonar was injuring marine mammals. I0 4 The district

100. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
18, § 2948).
101. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
102. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)).
103. Id. at 312.
104. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12-14 (2008). This Note will not
discuss Winter's complex environmental law issues and convoluted procedural history. For more
information, see Lisa Lightbody, Case Comment, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 593 (2009). See also Benjamin I. Narodick, Legal Update, Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council: Going into the Belly of the Whale of PreliminaryInjunctions
and Environmental Law, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH, L. 332 (2009).
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court issued a preliminary injunction, which the Ninth Circuit
upheld. 10 5 According to the Ninth Circuit, because the movants had
demonstrated a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits, they
needed to show only a possibility of irreparable injury in the absence
of the preliminary injunction. 106 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that a movant must always demonstrate a likelihood of
irreparable injury, not a mere possibility, regardless of the strength of
the other factors. 10 7 The Court emphasized that even if the movants
had shown a likelihood of irreparable injury and a likelihood of
success on the merits, the public's national security interest and the
Navy's interest "in effective, realistic training of its sailors"
outweighed the movants' ecological, scientific, and recreational
interests. 0 8 The fact that the movants' failure to prevail on the publicinterest factor was sufficient, by itself, to doom their quest for a
preliminary injunction suggests that the Winter court was performing
a sequential test. 10 9 The Court stated the preliminary injunction test
as follows: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest." 1 0
Winter holds that a movant must establish likely irreparable
injury. While it states that a plaintiff must establish that he is "likely
to succeed on the merits," it does not directly address the continuing
viability of sliding-scale (that is, balancing and threshold) preliminary
injunction tests. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated
her belief that the majority opinion did not foreclose sliding-scale
tests:
Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction ....
Consistent with equity's character,
courts do not insist that litigants uniformly show a particular, predetermined quantum
of probable success or injury before awarding equitable relief. Instead, courts have
evaluated claims for equitable relief on a "sliding scale," sometimes awarding relief
based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very high. This
Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.111

105. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2008),
aff-d, 518 F.3d 658, 696 (9th Cir. 2008).
106. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 696 (9th Cir. 2008).
107. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
108. Id. at 23-24.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Unsurprisingly, the circuits have split as to whether Winter forecloses
sliding-scale tests, with the Fourth Circuit holding that Winter
requires a movant to establish each of the four traditional factors
independently 12 and the Second and Seventh Circuits, and certain
panels of the Ninth Circuit, holding that some type of sliding-scale
113
test survives Winter.
B. Munaf v. Geren: Likely Success on the Merits, Not Likely
Jurisdiction
Before delving into the circuit split over Winter, it is worth
discussing two other recent Supreme Court cases involving
preliminary injunctions, Munaf v. Geren and Nken v. Holder, to
establish the limited nature of their holdings. In Munaf v. Geren, two
habeas petitioners, Mohammad Munaf and Shawqi Omar, sought to
enjoin their transfer from a detainee camp operated by the
Multinational Force-Iraq to the custody of the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq. 114 Omar had successfully obtained a preliminary injunction;
Munaf had not.1 15 The lower courts held that Omar satisfied the
success-on-the-merits
prong because the jurisdictional issues
presented questions "so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as
to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative
investigation."1 1 6 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on this
issue because serious jurisdictionalquestions are insufficient grounds
for a preliminary injunction: "A difficult question as to jurisdiction is,
of course, no reason to grant a preliminary injunction .... Indeed, if all
a 'likelihood of success on the merits' meant was that the district court
likely had jurisdiction, then preliminary injunctions would be the rule,
11 7
not the exception."
112. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
113. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d. 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that Winter does not foreclose all sliding-scale approaches toward granting a
preliminary injunction); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund,
Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (identifying "flexibility" as the value of the Second Circuit's
approach); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing the four Winter factors
as "interdependent").
114. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679-80 (2008).
115. Id. 681-85.
116. Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd 479 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. granted sub nom. Geren v. Omar, 552 U.S. 1074 (2007), and vacated sub nom. Munaf
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
117. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690.
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The Supreme Court stated that "a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must demonstrate, among other things, 'a likelihood of
success on the merits.' "118 This statement does not require a movant
to demonstrate anything beyond what Winter already requires. 11 9
Munaf and Winter described the factor in a similar manner-as a
likelihood, rather than a substantial likelihood, as some lower courts
have described it-and portrayed it as one required factor among
several. It does, however, appear to be a mandatory factor, as
' 120
indicated by "must demonstrate."
On the other hand, the specific version of the success-on-themerits factor the Supreme Court addressed in Munaf was the D.C.
Circuit's more relaxed serious-questions test. In contrast to its
treatment of the Ninth Circuit's possibility-of-irreparable-harm test in
Winter, the Supreme Court in Munaf declined to overrule the D.C.
Circuit's serious-questions test. 121 This implies the acceptability of a
more lenient version of the success-on-the-merits factor-in other
words, the movant can demonstrate either a likelihood of success on
the merits or serious questions going to the merits. It is possible,
however, that the Supreme Court simply declined to rule on the
validity of the D.C. Circuit's serious-questions test because it did not
need to do so to decide the case. This approach would be consistent
with the Court's historically minimalist manner of addressing
injunctions.
C. Nken v. Holder: Better-than-NegligibleChance of Success on the
Merits
The issue in Nken was which standard a judge should apply
when considering whether to stay an alien's removal, pending a ruling
on the alien's petition for review of the removal order. 122 The Court
held that the traditional four-factor test for stays still governed,
rejecting the Government's argument that the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made it more
difficult to obtain a stay. 123 The traditional test for stays closely

118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (laying out fourfactor test, including that movant is "likely to succeed on the merits").
120. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690.
121. See id. at 690-91 (holding that the district court abused its discretion when it granted a
preliminary injunction "without even considering the merits of the underlying habeas petition").
122. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1754-55 (2009).
123. Id. at 1756.
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resembles the traditional test for preliminary injunctions. 124 In
describing the traditional test for stays, the Supreme Court stated,
The first two factors [i.e., success on the merits and irreparable injury] of the traditional
standard are the most critical. It is not enough that the chance of success on the merits
be "better than negligible".
Even petitioner acknowledges that "[m]ore than a mere
'possibility' of relief is required." By the same token, simply showing some "possibility of
irreparable injury" fails to satisfy the second factor.
As the Court pointed out earlier this
12 5
Term, the " 'possibility' standard is too lenient."

The key question is whether the above paragraph applies only
to stays of removal orders or also to preliminary injunctions. On the
one hand, the paragraph is in the middle of a discussion of the
traditional test for stays, which suggests that the Court was only
describing stays. 126 In addition, only a few circuit courts have
considered whether Nken has a substantive impact on preliminary
injunctions, suggesting that most circuit courts do not believe Nken's
language is applicable to preliminary injunctions. 27 Furthermore,
when the Supreme Court has cited Nken, it has done so in the context
12
of stays, not preliminary injunctions.
On the other hand, the Court in Nken quoted Winter, which
suggests that perhaps it was describing both stays and preliminary
injunctions in the quoted paragraph. 29 In any event, it seems that the
"likely" in Winter requires a movant to show a higher level of potential
success on the merits than "better than negligible," so Mken may not
have much impact in the preliminary injunction context. It is also
important to remember that Nken's test for stays requires the
applicant to make a "strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the

124. Id. at 1761. The test is:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Id. (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. See Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing the four
considerations outlined in Nken for granting a stay); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 34-38 (2d Cir. 2010) (including an extended
discussion of Nken in the context of preliminary injunctions); Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (discussing Winter,
Nken, and Munaf as strongly suggesting invalidity of sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests).
128. When the Supreme Court has cited Nken, it has done so in the context of immigration.
See Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 838 (2010); United States v. Denedo, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 2224
(2009); Tesfagaber v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2074 (2009).
129. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761.
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merits," 130 which is just as high of a standard as, if not higher than,
Winter's "likely to succeed on the merits." 131
In his concurring opinion in Nken, Justice Kennedy more
clearly rejected a balancing test: "When considering success on the
merits and irreparable harm, courts cannot dispense with the required
showing of one simply because there is a strong likelihood of the other.
This is evident in the decisions of Justices of the Court applying the
traditional factors."'1 2 Again, it is not clear whether he was speaking
only about stays or also about preliminary and permanent injunctions.
Given the ambiguity in the Supreme Court's recent decisions, it
is unsurprising that lower courts have developed diverging
interpretations of these cases. The next Part examines this split, with
a special focus on Winter.
IV. THE CIRCUITS SPLIT

Four circuit courts have weighed in on whether Winter
forecloses sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests. The Fourth
Circuit has held that Winter mandates a sequential preliminary
injunction test and that therefore its longstanding threshold test is
invalid. In contrast, the Seventh and Second Circuits have held that
certain types of sliding-scale tests are compatible with Winter. The
Ninth Circuit has split, with some panels holding that Winter requires
a sequential test and others holding that a modified sliding-scale test
is still viable. The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have refrained from
deciding this question. The remaining circuits have not yet addressed
it.133

130. Id.
131. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
132. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1763 (Kennedy, J., concurring); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 445 (4th ed. 2010).
133. The Courts of Appeals that used sequential preliminary injunction tests prior to Winter
are not greatly affected by it, because their tests are equivalent to Winter's strictest readingthat each factor must be independently established. See, e.g., Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying sequential test). Some circuits have more
stringent tests than the one outlined in Winter, requiring the movant to show a "substantial"
likelihood of irreparable harm or success on the merits. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d
475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring movant to show "substantial" likelihood of prevailing on
merits and "substantial" threat of irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction);
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (requiring movant to show "substantial"
likelihood of success on the merits, in addition to the other three traditional factors). The circuits
with tests that are stricter than Winter have tended to cite Winter in support of their existing
sequential tests, but do not analyze it. See, e.g., Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d
816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Eighth Circuit, which used a balancing test prior to Winter, has so
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A. Fourth Circuit:Winter Forecloses Sliding-Scale Tests
Before Winter, the Fourth Circuit used a threshold preliminary
injunction test based on Blackwelder Furniture Co.134 The Fourth
Circuit test focused heavily on the balance of the hardships and
minimized the importance of the likelihood of success on the merits-a
focus the Fourth Circuit acknowledged might be out of step with
Supreme Court precedent, even prior to Winter.135 A movant first had
to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of a
preliminary injunction. 136 If he made this threshold showing, the court
proceeded to balance the likelihood of harm to the movant against the
likelihood of harm to the nonmovant. 137 If the balance of the hardships
tipped decidedly in favor of the movant, then he needed only to raise
"questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and
doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more
deliberate investigation."'' 38 If, on the other hand, the balance of the
hardships was substantially equal, then "the probability of success
begins to assume real significance, and interim relief is more likely to
require a clear showing of a likelihood of success."' 139 The court also
considered the public interest.140
In Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, the Fourth Circuit
held that Winter invalidated its Blackwelder test. 141 After repeating
Winter's version of the traditional four-factor test, the Fourth Circuit
added that "all four requirements must be satisfied."'142 The Fourth
far avoided deciding whether that test remains valid. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
645 F.3d 978, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2011).
134. Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2002); Blackwelder
Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 194-96 (4th Cir. 1977), overruled by Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds 130 S. Ct.
2371 (2010).
135. Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 868-71 (4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).

136. Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 271; Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d
802, 812 (4th Cir. 1992); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 360 (4th Cir.
1991).
137. Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 271.
138. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Direx Israel, Ltd., 952 F.2d at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196.
141. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), reissued in part 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (reissuing
Parts I and II of the Fourth Circuit's earlier opinion concerning preliminary injunctions). Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. did not address either Munaf or Nken, although both cases were
decided prior to it.
142. Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 346.
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Circuit went on to describe four ways in which its Blackwelder
standard was in "fatal tension" with Winter.143 First, according to the
Fourth Circuit, Blackwelder and progeny required a movant to
demonstrate only serious questions going to the merits, if they
examined the success-on-the-merits factor at all. 144 In contrast, Winter
always requires a movant to demonstrate that he is "likely to succeed
on the merits." 145 Second, the Fourth Circuit noted that Blackwelder
directs the court to balance the irreparable harm to the movant with
the harm to the nonmovant, requiring only that the former outweigh
the latter. 46 Blackwelder also states that if a movant makes a strong
showing of likely success on the merits, he need only show possible
irreparable injury.1 47 Winter explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's
possibility-of-irreparable-injury standard, holding that a movant
needed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury.1 48 Third, the
Supreme Court emphasized the public-interest factor in Winter, noting
that it weighed far more heavily in favor of the Navy, the
nonmovant1 49 In Blackwelder and progeny, however, the publicinterest factor is often an afterthought. 150 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
interpreted Winter as requiring a movant to make a sufficient showing
on each of the four traditional factors (in other words, a sequential
test).1 51 In contrast, Blackwelder explicitly allowed a "flexible
interplay 152 among the four factors.1 53 The Fourth Circuit' has
repeatedly affirmed its interpretation of Winter as requiring a
sequential test. 154

143. Id. at 346-47.
144. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195.
145. Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 346 (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
146. Id. at 347 (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196).
147. Id. (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195).
148. Winter, 55 U.S. at 22.
149. Id. at 24-26.
150. Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347.
151. Id.
152. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196 (quoting Packard Instrument Co. v. ANS, Inc., 416 F.2d
943, 945 (2d Cir. 1969)).
153. Id.
154. E.g., Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011); Scott v.
Bierman, 429 F. App'x 225, 228-29 (4th Cir. 2011); WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs.,
Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009).
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B. Seventh and Second Circuits: Sliding Scale Survives Winter
Two circuit courts-the Seventh and Second-have held that
Winter does not foreclose all sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests.
1. Seventh Circuit
Prior to Winter, the Seventh Circuit had developed a threshold
preliminary injunction test. A movant had to demonstrate that he
would be irreparably harmed in the absence of a preliminary
injunction, that he had no adequate remedy at law, and that he was
somewhat likely to succeed on the merits. 155 If a movant made these
showings, a court would then "balance the nature and degree of the
plaintiffs injury, the likelihood of prevailing at trial, the possible
injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted, and the wild card
that is the 'public interest.' "156 The Seventh Circuit occasionally
stated its preliminary injunction test in such a way that the test
sounded closer to a balancing test than a threshold test. 157 The court
consistently emphasized flexibility and interplay among the factors,
however. For instance, in Roland Machinery Co., the court stated,
"The more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the
balance of harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the
more need it weigh in his favor. This is a most important principle,
and one well supported by cases in this and other circuits, and by
158
scholarly commentary."
In Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. John
Hancock Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff and defendants had engaged
in a complex financial transaction that the district court described as
combining "the sometimes toxic intricacies of credit default swaps and
investment derivatives with a blatantly abusive tax shelter." 159 The
transaction was on shaky ground because credit-rating agencies had

155. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986); Roland Mach.
Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1984).
156. Lawson Prods., Inc., 782 F.2d at 1433.
157. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir.
1986) ("The court asks whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary
injunction is denied (sometimes also whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law),
whether the harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied will exceed the harm to
the defendant if it is granted, whether the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prevail at trial, and
whether the public interest will be affected by granting or denying the injunction.").
158. Roland Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at 387-88.
159. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d
919, 921 (S.D. Ind. 2008), affd, 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
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downgraded defendant-surety Ambac's rating. 160 The plaintiff Hoosier
Energy sought and obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendants from asserting that a default had occurred and from
making any demand or payment pursuant to such an assertion. 161 The
district court found that each of the four traditional factors had been
met, but in affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit
implicitly held that its sliding-scale test-or at least some variety of
sliding-scale test-remained valid in the wake of Winter:
Irreparable injury is not enough to support equitable relief. There also must be a
plausible claim on the merits, and the injunction must do more good than harm (which
is to say that the 'balance of the equities" favors the plaintiff). How strong a claim on
the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an injunction
can prevent, the weaker the plaintiffs claim on the merits can be while still supporting
16 2
some preliminary relief.

Instead of quoting Winter's test verbatim, like the Fourth
Circuit, 163 the court restated it and slightly rephrased the success-onthe-merits factor. Winter stated that a movant must demonstrate he is
"likely to succeed on the merits,"' 64 and the Seventh Circuit
16 5
interpreted this as equivalent to "a plausible claim on the merits.'
"Plausible" sounds more lenient than "likely," however. The Seventh
Circuit also stated that the greater the potential harm to the movant,
the weaker his claim on the merits could be and still support a
166
preliminary injunction.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Hoosier Energy's interpretation
of Winter in Judge v. Quinn. In Judge, the court restated Winter's
four-factor test, essentially word for word, and then added, "These
considerations are interdependent: the greater the likelihood of
success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction must prevent
1 67
in order for preliminary relief to be warranted."
A more recent Seventh Circuit case also affirms the circuit's
continued embrace of a threshold test. In Michigan v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725
(7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
163. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
164. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 55 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
165. Hoosier Energy, 582 F.3d at 725.
166. Id.
167. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Hoosier Energy, 582 F.3d at
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Illinois denied a preliminary injunction sought by several states
attempting to prevent invasive, non-native carp from entering the
Great Lakes. 168 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the District
Court's finding that the plaintiff-states failed to establish that they
were likely to succeed on the merits. 169 The Seventh Circuit also held
that the states had demonstrated that they were likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.170
Nevertheless, because the balance of the harms favored the
defendants, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision
not to grant the preliminary injunction. 171 The court referred to
success on the merits and irreparable harm as the "threshold
requirement[s]" for preliminary injunctions and to the balancing of the
harms and the consideration of the public interest as the "balancing
process."' 72 This language, combined with the court's analytical
process, clearly indicates the court's use of a threshold test.
Although none of the Seventh Circuit cases provides much
analysis of why Winter permits sliding-scale tests, the Seventh Circuit
believes it does not need to make any major changes to its pre- Winter
threshold test. Perhaps the Seventh Circuit is able to justify upholding
its pre- Winter test because in several pre- Winter cases, it stated that
the movant must demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of a preliminary injunction.' 73 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's
pre-Winter test was already consistent with Winter's narrow holding.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's pre-Winter test allowed the
irreparable-harm factor to slide; under Blackwelder, if a movant made
a strong showing of likely success on the merits, he only needed to
show possible irreparable harm. 74 Winter explicitly held only that
showing likely irreparable harm was necessary, not that a likelihood
of success on the merits was the required interpretation of the successon-the-merits prong. 175

168. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-3891, 2011 WL 3836457, at *1 (7th Cir.
Aug. 24, 2011).
169. Id. at *19.
170. Id. at *22.
171. Id. at *23.
172. Id. at *20, *23.
173. E.g., Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2002); Roland
Mach. Co. v. Dressers Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984).
174. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cr. 2009) (citing
Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977)).
175. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. at 22-24 (2008).
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2. Second Circuit
Prior to Winter, the Second Circuit had developed a threshold
preliminary injunction test. A movant had to show: "(1) irreparable
harm in the absence of the injunction and (2) either (a) a likelihood of
success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor."'1 76 Under this test,
a court only considers the hardship a preliminary injunction would
impose on the nonmovant if the movant fails to show likely success on
the merits. 177 Also somewhat unusually, this test does not explicitly
include the public interest.
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Citigroup sought and
obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. from proceeding with arbitration. 178
The district court applied the Second Circuit's threshold test, finding
that Citigroup had demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm and
serious questions going to the merits. 179 The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision and, in so doing, confirmed the continuing
vitality of its threshold test.180 According to the Second Circuit, earlier
Supreme Court precedent supports its threshold test, which always
requires irreparable injury but allows the success-on-the-merits factor
to slide. l8 1 In Ohio Oil, the Supreme Court stated, "Where the
questions presented by an application for an interlocutory injunction
are grave, and the injury to the moving party [in the absence of such
an injunction] will be certain and irreparable . . . the injunction
usually will be granted." 182 In addition, in Mazurek v. Armstrong,
while holding that the movant had not demonstrated a fair chance of
success on the merits, the Supreme Court recognized that courts
would apply the "fair chance" standard in future cases. 8 3 According to
the Second Circuit, these cases reveal the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement that it can be difficult to discern at the preliminary
176. Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 2002); accord
Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979).
177. Random House, 283 F.3d at 491-92.
178. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., No. 08-CV5520 (BSJ), 2008 WL 4891229, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008), aff'd, 598 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2010).
179. Id. at *2, *5.
180. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 32-34 (2nd Cir. 2010).
181. Id. at 36-38.
182. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 814 (1929).
183. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 36 (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997)).
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injunction stage whether the movant is more likely than not to
18 4
succeed on the merits.
The Second Circuit also thought the Supreme Court's failure to
explicitly overrule sliding-scale tests was significant: "If the Supreme
Court had meant for Munaf, Winter, or Nken to abrogate the more
flexible standard for a preliminary injunction, one would expect some
reference to the considerable history of the flexible standards applied
in this circuit, seven of our sister circuits, and in the Supreme Court
itself."18 5 As the Second Circuit noted, Munaf did not explain how
likely a "likelihood of success on the merits" needed to be; it merely
stated that a court had to consider the underlying merits, not simply
the jurisdictional issues.1 8 6 The Second Circuit read Winter narrowly,
as addressing only the irreparable-harm factor: "While Winter rejected
the Ninth Circuit's conceptually separate 'possibility of irreparable
harm' standard, it expressly withheld any consideration of the merits
of the parties' underlying claims. Rather, the Court decided the case
upon the balance of the equities and the public interest."187 Regarding
Nken, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court restated the
"likely to succeed on the merits" phrasing, but the Court did not
explain the content of this factor.1 88 Nken contrasted a likelihood of
success on the merits-an acceptable showing-with a chance of
success that is only "better than negligible"-an unacceptably low
showing. According to the Second Circuit, because "serious questions
going to the merits" necessarily indicate a chance of success that is
better than negligible, its serious-questions test is not in conflict with
18 9
Nken.
The Second Circuit maintained that its preliminary injunction
test is useful because the "serious questions going to the merits"
option "permits a district court to grant a preliminary injunction in
situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving
party is more likely than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying
claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits of not granting the
injunction."1 90 The Second Circuit's approach seems to be that until
the Supreme Court directly addresses the success-on-the-merits prong
and enunciates a clear standard, it will continue to apply the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 36-38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 37; Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008).
Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37 (citations omitted).
Id.
Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009); Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37 n.7.
Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35.
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"venerable" standard it has used for the past several decades. 19 ' The
Second Circuit has since repeatedly affirmed and applied the test it
192
articulated in Citigroup.
C. Ninth Circuit:IntracircuitSplit
The Ninth Circuit used a balancing approach before Winter's
rejection of the irreparable-injury component of that test. The Ninth
Circuit stated in Lands Council v. McNair, "A preliminary injunction
is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates either: (1) a likelihood of
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2)
that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance
of hardships tips sharply in [the plaintiffs] favor."' 193 Winter overruled
the "possibility of irreparable injury" language in the first part of the
test, holding that "likely" irreparable injury was required. 94 The
Ninth Circuit has split as to whether Winter permits any version of
the Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter sliding-scale test.
1. Sliding-Scale Test
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell is the Ninth Circuit
case that most thoroughly addresses whether some version of a
sliding-scale test might survive the Supreme Court's rebuke in
Winter.195 In Alliance, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies sought a
preliminary injunction that would stop a timber salvage sale proposed
by the U.S. Forest Service. 196 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana declined to issue the injunction, holding that the Alliance
failed to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of irreparable injury and
success on the merits. 97 The Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court committed an error of law by failing to apply the serious191. Id. at 38.
192. E.g., UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011);
Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v.
City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2010); Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d
148, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
193. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
194. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20-22 (2008).
195. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). According to the
Alliance court, previous Ninth Circuit cases discussing Winter addressed only the irreparableharm component. Id. at 1132 (citing Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046 (9th
Cir. 2009); Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)).
196. Id. at 1128-29.
197. Id. at 1130.
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questions test and ordered it to issue the injunction. 198 After reviewing
the reasoning of the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in the cases
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit held that a somewhat stricter
version of its pre-Winter sliding-scale test was consistent with Winter:
" '[S]erious questions going to the merits' and a balance of hardships
that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of an
injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows a likelihood of
irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest."199
The Alliance court interpreted Winter as requiring a movant to
make a showing on all four factors to obtain a preliminary
injunction. 200 It described the irreparable-injury and public-interest
factors in almost identical language as Winter-"likelihood of
irreparable injury" (similar to "likely to suffer irreparable harm" in
Winter) and the "injunction is in the public interest" (identical to
Winter).20 1 However, the Alliance court phrased the other two factors
slightly differently than the Supreme Court did in Winter. It said that
a movant can still prevail by showing only "serious questions" going to
the merits (rather than Winter's "likely to succeed on the merits"), as
long as the movant also shows that the balance of the hardships tips
sharply in his favor. 20 2 In other words, in order to proceed under the
serious-questions-on-the-merits test, the movant must make a higher
showing with respect to the balance of the hardships.
The Ninth Circuit supported its decision to uphold a slidingscale test in Alliance with similar reasons as the Second Circuit: the
importance of judicial flexibility in the face of disputed facts and
unresolved legal issues and the Supreme Court's silence on the issue
of sliding-scale tests. 20 3 The Ninth Circuit also quoted approvingly
from District Judge William Alsup's reading of Winter:
It would be most unfortunate if the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit had eliminated
the longstanding discretion of a district judge to preserve the status quo with provisional
relief until the merits could be sorted out in cases where clear irreparable injury would
otherwise result and at least "serious questions" going to the merits are raised ....This
would be such a dramatic reversal in the law that it should be very clearly indicated by
20 4
appellate courts before a district court concludes that it has no such power.

198. Id. at 1128, 1135.
199. Id. at 1135.
200. Id.
201. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 ("likely to suffer irreparable
harm"); Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1135 ("likelihood of irreparable injury").
202. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1135.
203. Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1133-34.
204. Id. at 1134 (quoting Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep't of Energy, No. C 08-03494, 2009
WL 1098888, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009)).
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Therefore, like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in Alliance
believed that in the absence of explicit Supreme Court language
overruling sliding-scale tests, these tests survive. 20 5
2. Sequential Test
Alliance was not the Ninth Circuit's only word on preliminary
injunctions, however. In DISH Network Corp. v. Federal
Communications Commission, DISH sought to preliminarily enjoin §
207 of the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010,
which accelerated the timetable under which satellite providers that
carry local stations in high definition must also carry "qualified
noncommercial educational television stations" in high definition,
arguing that § 207 violated the First Amendment. 206 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the district court's denial of DISH's motion for a
preliminary injunction, holding that because DISH had failed to
demonstrate it was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim, it was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction. 207 The Ninth Circuit held that
to obtain a preliminary injunction, DISH had to "demonstrate that it
meets all four of the elements of the preliminary injunction test
established in Winter."208 According to the Ninth Circuit, DISH's
failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits was sufficient
grounds for denying a preliminary injunction-in other words, a
sequential test.20 9 The DISH court did not address whether DISH
could have succeeded under the serious-questions test articulated by
the Alliance court.
Several other Ninth Circuit cases join DISH in reading Winter
as requiring a sequential test. In Klein v. City of San Clemente, a
private citizen sought to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of a city

205. Several subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have approvingly cited Alliance's version of
the serious-questions test. See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2011);
Franklin v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1355 (9th Cir. 2011); Vanguard Outdoor, LLC v. City of
L.A., 648 F.3d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 2011).
206. DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2011), amending and
superseding, on denial of reh'g en banc, DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 636 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir.
2011).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 776.
209. See id. at 776-77 ("Therefore, even if we were to determine that DISH is likely to
succeed on the merits, we would still need to consider whether it satisfied the remaining

elements of the preliminary injunction test. However, because we agree with the district court
that DISH has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating it has met the first element, we need
not consider the remaining three.").
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ordinance prohibiting the leafleting of unoccupied vehicles. 210 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Klein's motion for
a preliminary injunction. 2 11 The Ninth Circuit held that a movant had
to demonstrate each of the four traditional factors in order to obtain a
preliminary injunction and that Klein had successfully done so. 212 The
Ninth Circuit therefore reversed and remanded for further
21 3
proceedings, including the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
In American Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, American
Trucking Associations
sought to preliminarily
enjoin the
implementation of mandatory concession agreements for short-term
214
trucking services at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.
Applying the Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter test, because Winter had not
yet been decided, the district court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction. 215 The Ninth Circuit reversed based on a de
novo review of the applicable substantive law. The Ninth Circuit held
that American Trucking Associations was likely to succeed on the
merits, was likely to suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of
the hardships and the public interest weighed in favor of granting the
preliminary injunction. 216 The Ninth Circuit's analysis of all four
factors, combined with its statement that "[t]o the extent that our
cases have suggested a lesser standard [than Winter], they are no
longer controlling, or even viable," suggests that the court used a
217
sequential test in this case.
In Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, the district court applied the
Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter test, as Winter had not yet been decided,
and granted an injunction preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of
new rules promulgated by the Washington State Board of Pharmacy,
which prohibited pharmacists from refusing to fill lawful prescriptions
because of their personal religious or moral objections. 218 The district
court held that Stormans had demonstrated likely success on the
merits of its Free Exercise Clause claim and the possibility of
210. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2009).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1207 ("Klein has thus demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim .... To warrant injunctive relief, however, Klein must also demonstrate that he is likely to
suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and that the balance of
equities and the public interest tip in his favor.").
213. Id. at 1208.
214. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009).
215. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
216. Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1057, 1059-60.
217. Id. at 1052.
218. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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irreparable harm. 219 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the district court erred in its substantive legal analysis of
the merits of the movant's claim. 220 The Ninth Circuit also held that
the district court erred in failing to fully analyze the balance of the
221
hardships and the public interest, an analysis required by Winter.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Stormans and its order requiring the
district court to examine all four factors of the preliminary injunction
222
test point strongly to the court's adoption of a sequential test.
In National Meat Ass'n v. Brown, the district court, applying
the Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter standard, had granted the National
Meat Association's motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of the amendments to section 599f of the California Penal
Code, which requires humane treatment of nonambulatory animals
and bans their slaughter and receipt. 223 The Ninth Circuit vacated the
injunction. 224 The Ninth Circuit noted that even though the district
court applied the Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter sliding-scale test, the
district court "found that NMA is likely to succeed and faces a
significant threat of irreparable injury, and that the balance of the
equities and the public interest favors NMA"; the Ninth Circuit stated
that "[t]hese findings enable us to review the injunction under Winter
without remanding for application of the new standard." 225 The Ninth
Circuit noted, however, that in some instances, the fact that a lower
court applied the pre-Winter test "may require remand for application
of the Winter standard."226 This analysis suggests the court's belief
that sliding-scale tests are incompatible with Winter.
These cases, all of which were decided prior to Alliance, cast
doubt on the Alliance court's assertion that "[o]ur circuit has not yet
directly discussed in a published opinion the post- Winter viability of
the sliding scale approach." 22 7 The Alliance court may be technically
correct that none of these cases specifically discussed whether or not a
sliding-scale test remained valid. But after examining Winter, these
panels all chose to apply a sequential test instead of a sliding-scale

219. Id.
220. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
221. Id. at 1138-40.
222. Id. at 1127-40.
223. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, No. 10-224, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
224. Id. at 1102.
225. Id. at 1097 n.3.
226. Id.
227. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011).
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test, indicating their belief that the sequential test represented the
correct approach. Several Ninth Circuit cases decided after Alliance
also chose the Stormans approach. 228
In Quiroga v. Chen, Judge Gloria Navarro of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada noted the tension between the Ninth
Circuit's two lines of cases and attempted to resolve it.229 Judge
Navarro first stated that to the extent the Alliance interpretation of
Winter is inconsistent with the Stormans interpretation of Winter,
Stormans controls under Ninth Circuit precedent.2 3 0 According to
Judge Navarro, Winter clearly requires a movant to demonstrate
likely success on the merits 23 1: "To the extent the Cottrell court meant
to imply that its 'serious questions' standard was a lesser standard
than 'likely,' it is inconsistent with Winter and [Stormans]."232 Judge
Navarro reasoned that the Ninth Circuit could reconcile Alliance with
Winter and Stormans by interpreting Alliance's "serious questions"
standard as essentially equivalent to Winter's and Stormans's "likely"
standard:
The movant must therefore show that there are serious questions as to the merits of the
case such that success on the merits is likely. A claim can be weaker on the merits if it
raises "serious questions" and the amount of harm the injunction will prevent is very
233
great, but the chance of success on the merits cannot be weaker than "likely."

It is not clear whether the Alliance court would agree with
Judge Navarro's interpretation of its decision. 234 The Alliance court
did not disturb the district court's finding that the movant had not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits, but the Alliance court
reversed the district court and ordered it to issue the injunction,
holding that the movant had shown serious questions going to the
merits and that this was a sufficient showing on the merits.23 5 This
228. E.g., Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing sequential test in
Stormans); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that all
four factors are required); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citing Stormans).
229. Quiroga v. Chen, 735 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228-29 (D. Nev. 2010).
230. Id. at 1229 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that, in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision, only the en banc court
may overrule a decision by a three-judge panel)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See generally Paul W. Conable & Frank J. Weiss, Surviving Winter: The Ninth Circuit
Reaffirms the "Serious Questions" Test for Injunctive Relief, OR. ST. B. LITIG. J., Fall 2011, at 15,
18-19, available at http://www.osblitigation.com/lj2011-fall.pdf (discussing the points of potential
divergence between the two opinions).
235. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).
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suggests that, contrary to Judge Navarro's attempt to reconcile the
two standards, a serious question sufficient to require issuance of a
preliminary injunction can exist even when it is not likely that the
movant will prevail on the merits. 236
D. Tenth and D. C. Circuits: Undecided
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have not yet offered definitive
interpretations of Winter.
1. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit's pre-Winter preliminary injunction test had
two tracks: If the movant was trying to obtain one of the types of
injunctions the Tenth Circuit had identified as "disfavored" (that is,
mandatory, altering the status quo, or giving him all the relief he
sought), he had to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood" of success on
the merits, as well as heightened showings on the other three
traditional factors. 237 If, on the other hand, the injunction was not one
of the disfavored types, then the movant needed to show only
"questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and
doubtful, as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of
more deliberate investigation," in addition to satisfying the other
238
three factors.
The two cases in which the Tenth Circuit discussed Winter both
involved mandatory preliminary injunctions subject to the heightened
"substantial likelihood" standard, and therefore the Tenth Circuit has
not yet had reason to address whether its "serious questions" standard
remains viable. 239 In both of these cases, the Tenth Circuit repeated
Winter's articulation of the preliminary injunction test without

analyzing

it.240

Nevertheless, the fact that the Tenth Circuit has

prefaced its quotation of the Winter test with the statement that in
236. Id. at 1134-37; Conable & Weiss, supra note 234, at 19.
237. RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009); see also 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction that alters the status quo, the movant "should
always have to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits"), affd sub nom.
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
238. RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1208 n.3 (quoting Walmer v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 52 F.3d
851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995)); Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1992)).
239. Attorney Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 775 (10th Cir. 2009); RoDa
Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1208-09.
240. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d at 776 (10th Cir. 2009); RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1208.
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order to "obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
demonstrate four factors" suggests that it may be leaning toward
adopting a sequential test.241
2. D.C. Circuit
Before Winter, the D.C. Circuit used a balancing test based on
the four traditional factors. 242 In Serono Laboratories,Inc. v. Shalala,
the court explained, "These factors interrelate on a sliding scale and
must be balanced against each other. 'If the arguments for one factor
are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the arguments
in other areas are rather weak.' "243
In Davis v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., a post-Winter case,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction. 244 The court noted that Winter "could be read to create a
more demanding burden, although the decision does not squarely
discuss whether the four factors are to be balanced on a sliding
scale." 245 It then declined to decide whether Winter requires a stricter
preliminary injunction test, because it found the movant would not be
able to satisfy even its less-demanding sliding-scale test.246 It did,
however, cite Justice Ginsburg's statement in her dissent that Winter
does not overrule sliding-scale tests. 24 7 Declining to decide the
question, in conjunction with quoting Justice Ginsburg's dissent, may
indicate that the D.C. Circuit hopes to find a way to preserve its
balancing test in some form.
The D.C. Circuit again addressed Winter, and again declined to
adopt a decisive reading of the decision, in Sherley v. Sebelius. 248 After
acknowledging the ongoing circuit split regarding how to read Winter,
the court remarked, 'Weneed not wade into this circuit split today
because, as in Davis, as detailed below, in this case a preliminary
injunction is not appropriate even under the less demanding slidingscale analysis." 249 Nevertheless, the court noted that "we
read Winter at least to suggest if not to hold 'that a likelihood of
241. RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1208.
242. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
243. Id. at 1318 (quoting CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
244. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
245. Id. at 1292.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
249. Id. at 393.
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V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT A SEQUENTIAL TEST WITH A

SERIOUS-QUESTIONS TEST AVAILABLE IN NARROW CIRCUMSTANCES
The absence of a single federal preliminary injunction standard
has led the circuit courts to develop a profusion of conflicting
standards. The circuit courts' differing standards are problematic
because they likely lead to inconsistent judgments 25 1 and may
252
therefore encourage litigants to forum-shop.
A. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Clearly Stated Sequential Test
The Supreme Court should adopt a sequential preliminary
injunction test. Arguably, it already did in Winter, for the following
reasons: (1) the most natural reading of Winter is that it stated a
sequential test; (2) the Supreme Court in other decisions has cited
Winter as supporting a sequential test; (3) Munaf, Nken, and earlier
Supreme Court decisions support the notion that likely success on the
merits is a required element of the preliminary injunction test; (4) the
likely-success-on-the-merits test is easier for judges to apply
consistently than the serious-questions test; and (5) in most instances,
federal judges have the institutional expertise to predict the merits of
a case at the preliminary injunction stage, so a serious-questions test
that relaxes and confuses this inquiry is unnecessary.
The Court should fashion a narrow exception to the sequential
test, however, and account for the views of the circuits that believe the
sequential test does not provide sufficient flexibility. A movant should
be able to obtain a preliminary injunction by showing serious
questions going to the merits and by showing a balance of the
hardships that tips sharply in his favor in certain limited
circumstances where the exigencies make it difficult for the court to
determine the likelihood of success with much confidence. These
circumstances might include: (1) with respect to factual matters, when
the district court finds that it needs substantial additional factual
development to understand the merits claims, even after litigants
have filed papers and received a hearing, if there is one; or (2) with

250. Id.
251. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 840.
252. See supra note 25 (providing an example of forum-shopping due to differing standards).
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respect to legal issues, when the question is one of first impression in
the circuit and there is no controlling Supreme Court precedent.
1. The Plain Language of Winter Denotes a Sequential Test
The most natural reading of Winter is that it requires a
sequential test, with likely success on the merits constituting one of
the four required elements. Winter's articulation of the traditional
preliminary injunction test contains four factors, joined by semicolons
and the conjunction "and."253 Typically, this sort of formulation
indicates a list where all of the elements are required. The Second and
Seventh Circuits attempt to skirt this natural reading by suggesting
that because the Supreme Court did not explicitly mention or overrule
sliding-scale tests, they remain viable. 254 These courts emphasize that
they require an unequivocal overruling from the Supreme Court
before doing away with their longstanding sliding-scale tests. Yet, the
Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme Court "articulated clearly" a
sequential test in Winter,25 5 and numerous Ninth Circuit panels
reached the same conclusion. 256 The Second and Seventh Circuits
ignore the plain meaning of Winter's text and instead invoke the
"venerab[ility]" of their sliding-scale tests in order to justify their
257
conclusions.
The Ninth Circuit in Alliance acknowledges that Winter
requires a showing of each of the four elements, 258 but argues that it
may substitute "serious questions" for "likely success on the merits,"
so long as the movant also shows that the balance of the hardships
tips sharply in his favor. Yet, there is simply no indication in the text
of Winter that the serious-questions standard, which is easier to
satisfy than the likely-success-on-the-merits standard, is an
acceptable general alternative. 259 The natural reading of Winter is that
253. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
254. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009).
255. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
othergrounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
256. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1097 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), cert granted, 131
S. Ct. 3083 (2011); DISH Network Corp. v. FEC, 636 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011); Klein v.
City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d
1109, 1127-40 (9th Cir. 2009).
257. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 38; Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010).
258. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
259. Justice Ginsburg, who dissented in Winter, might disagree. Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51-52 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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it requires a movant to independently demonstrate each of the four
traditional factors.
2. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Support a Sequential Test
The Supreme Court's own subsequent interpretation of Winter
also supports reading Winter as requiring a sequential test. In
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the Court held that a movant
seeking a permanent injunction to remedy a National Environmental
Policy Act violation had to establish each of the four traditional factors
separately and cited Winter for this proposition. 260 Although the
permanent injunction test necessarily comprises slightly different
factors than the preliminary injunction test, 26 1 the Supreme Court's
citation of Winter to bolster the proposition that all of these factors are
required in the permanent injunction context supports reading Winter
as enunciating a sequential test.
Munaf, Nken, and other Supreme Court cases also favor a
sequential test. Munaf affirmed that "a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must demonstrate, among other things, 'a likelihood of
success on the merits.' "262 This language clearly characterizes the
success-on-the-merits prong as mandatory and lends credence to a
similar reading of Winter, which used almost identical language to
describe the success-on-the-merits prong.
Nken does not strictly apply to preliminary injunctions, but it
may nevertheless shed some light on the Supreme Court's position
after Winter.26 3 At the very least, Nken does not undermine reading
Winter as requiring a sequential test because the test the Court sets
26 4 If
out in Nken parallels the test in Winter in form and content.
260. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010).
261. In order to obtain a permanent injunction, a movant must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
Id. at 2748 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
262. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008).
263. Nken v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009).
264. The Nken test is:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of a stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Id. at 1761 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
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Winter states a sequential test, then so does Nken. If Winter does not
foreclose sliding-scale tests, then neither does Nken.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Nken, which Justice
Scalia joined, might signify the direction the Court will take in the
future, particularly because Justice Kennedy is so often the deciding
vote on close questions. Although the majority was content to state
that the traditional four-factor test still applied to stays and that a
movant had to demonstrate more than a possibility of irreparable
harm and more than a possibility of success on the merits (echoing its
holding in Winter), Justice Kennedy more clearly rejected any sort of
sliding-scale test: "When considering success on the merits and
irreparable harm, courts cannot dispense with the required showing of
one simply because there is a strong likelihood of the other. This is
evident in the decisions of Justices of the Court applying the
traditional factors." 265 If a future case required the Court to rule
directly on the validity of sliding-scale tests, the rationale in Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion might well command a majority of the
Justices.
Earlier Supreme Court cases on preliminary injunctions also
support reading Winter as enunciating a sequential test, with likely
success on the merits as one of the required factors. In Doran, the
Court stated that the movant must show "he will suffer irreparable
injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits."21 6 In Yakus,
the Court indicated that irreparable injury was necessary, but not
sufficient, to obtain a preliminary injunction. 267 The Court in Mazurek
emphasized the movant's high burden, particularly with respect to
showing likely success on the merits. 268 In Grupo Mexicano, the Court
noted that judicial flexibility is not limitless: 'Wedo not question the
proposition that equity is flexible; but in the federal system, at least,
that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional

265. Id. at 1763 (Kennedy, J., concurring); LAYCOCK, supra note 132, at 445. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Nken can be read as a response to Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Winter,
which suggested that sliding-scale tests remain viable. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1763 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 51-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
267. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) ("[T]he award of an interlocutory
injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though
irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff.").
268. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("[A] preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear
showing, carries the burden of persuasion.") (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 18,§ 2948)).
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equitable relief."26 9 In contrast, the cases that the Second Circuit cited
in support of its sliding-scale test were several decades older, 270 and
these cases emphasized judges' flexibility to shape the remedy, not
their flexibility to decide whether to grant the preliminary injunction
in the first instance. 271
3. A Sequential Test Is Fairer than a Balancing Test Requiring Only
Serious Questions
Although sliding-scale tests have the apparent advantage of
greater flexibility, the Supreme Court should affirm a sequential test
because it contains sufficient flexibility and is easier to apply
consistently and impartially. It is true that it is sometimes difficult for
a judge to predict a movant's chances of succeeding on the merits at
the preliminary injunction stage. 272 The serious-questions test (or,
alternatively, the Seventh Circuit's analogous "plausible claim on the
merits" test) 273 is appealing because it enables a judge who thinks the
movant is perhaps forty percent likely to succeed on the merits to hold
that the merits prong is satisfied, even if the judge is not comfortable
saying that the movant is likely (that is, more than fifty percent
likely) to succeed on the merits of his claim. 274
Yet, the disadvantages of sliding-scale tests outweigh the
advantage of flexibility. First, a movant with little chance of
ultimately prevailing on his claim should not be able to obtain a
preliminary injunction; this takes up valuable court and litigant time
and imposes a heavy cost on the nonmovant, who suffers from an
injunction when the nonmovant will ultimately prevail on the
275
merits.

269. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322
(1999).
270. E.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 813-14 (1929).
271. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
272. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
273. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725
(7th Cir. 2009).
274. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the Alliance "has, at a minimum, raised 'serious questions' on the merits of its
claim regarding the validity of the Chief Forester's Emergency Situation Determination").
275. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 538 (arguing that sliding-scale tests should not be used
because they allow parties with little chance of ultimately prevailing on the merits to obtain
preliminary injunctions, manipulating the judicial process and "wast[ing] valuable and limited
court time").
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Second, it is unclear how serious of a question the seriousquestions test requires. None of the circuits that use it has articulated
a definition, other than Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank's original
statement, which was itself rather vague. 276 The serious-questions test
could encompass a broad range of merits probabilities, from just above
"fairly negligible" to just below, or even including, "likely to succeed."
This broad range means that the likelihood of obtaining a preliminary
injunction under the serious-questions test could vary considerably
from judge to judge, even within the same circuit. The seriousquestions test is therefore more difficult for judges to apply
consistently than the likely-success-on-the-merits
test, which
naturally seems to parallel the preponderance of the evidence
standard used in civil litigation-that is, more likely than not or just
over a fifty percent chance. 2 77 Moreover, because the serious-questions
test allows the balance of the hardships to override difficulties in the
movant's merits claims, this test may encourage the granting of
injunctions to sympathetic plaintiffs whose legal cases may not be
terribly strong. A court should not be able to alter the relative
positions of the parties, sometimes dramatically, without the movant
first establishing that he is at least likely to prevail on the merits. The
serious-questions test is therefore in tension with the traditional
characterization of preliminary injunctions as rare, extraordinary
remedies. 2 7 8 Furthermore, because the serious-questions test is less
clear than the sequential test, it is less likely to be applied uniformly
by judges and more likely to lead to unfair outcomes and forumshopping.
Third, it is not clear that the serious-questions test necessarily
requires a movant to make a merits showing much higher than what
is required to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

276. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953) ("[Imt will
ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more
deliberate investigation.").
277. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009) ("This is the burden of proof in most civil
trials, in which the jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger
evidence, however slight the edge may be."). Most commentators assume that "likely" means
more likely than not. See, e.g., Denlow, supra note 1, at 532-34 (arguing that a party seeking a
preliminary injunction should be required to prove at least a fifty-percent chance of prevailing on
the merits). Precise quantification of probabilities in any given case is difficult, of course, but this
should not prevent the Supreme Court from enunciating a clear standard.
278. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
18, § 2948) ("[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.").

1054

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:3:1011

Procedure 12(b)(6), particularly after Ashcroft v. Iqba 279 and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 28 0 which require the plaintiff to plead
sufficient facts to state a "plausible" claim. 281 But the history of
preliminary injunctions, as well as Supreme Court precedent, shows
that preliminary injunctions have always been an "extraordinary"
remedy, because they impose significant burdens on the nonmovant
without the benefit of a full trial. 28 2 It would be anomalous, to say the
least, if the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction,
traditionally an exceptional remedy, were not substantially higher
than the standard for surviving a motion to dismiss, the first and
lowest hurdle a civil claim must clear. It seems doubtful that the
Court would endorse a test that could be read to relax the preliminary
injunction standard to such a degree.
The Second and Seventh Circuits, and some members of the
Ninth Circuit, attempt to balance the relaxed merits showing of the
serious-questions test and plausible-claim test by also requiring the
movant to make a heightened hardship showing. Yet, these are two
analytically distinct inquiries. No matter how much harm the movant
may suffer, that does not logically overcome a low chance that he will
ultimately succeed on his claim.
4. Federal Judges Have the Expertise to Predict Likely Success on the
Merits
The major justification for sliding-scale tests is the difficulty of
predicting success on the merits at the preliminary injunction stage. It
is too difficult, the argument goes, for movants to demonstrate and for
judges to determine likelihood of success on the merits at such an
early stage of litigation. 28 3 Yet, this argument ignores some of the
practicalities of litigation, particularly in federal courts. Federal
judges are experienced at deciding issues of federal law and, in most
279. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ('The plausibility standard is not akin to
a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.").
280. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....
").
281. In fact, in Hoosier Energy, the Seventh Circuit characterized the movant's required
showing as only a "plausible claim on the merits," which sounds quite similar to the showing
required to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss following Twombly and Iqbal. Hoosier Energy
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009).
282. See supraPart II (providing a brief history of preliminary injunctions).
283. See, e.g., Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standardfor Preliminary
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1554-55 (2011) (discussing the
advantages of the sliding-scale approach).
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instances, are well equipped to predict whether a movant is more
likely than not to succeed on the merits of his claim. 28 4 In addition,
when seeking a preliminary injunction, the movants typically focus on
their strongest, clearest, and most compelling arguments, so it seems
reasonable to expect the movants to be able to demonstrate that these
carefully selected arguments are likely to succeed on the merits.
B. The Supreme Court Should Require a Movant to Show Likely
Success on the Merits, but There May Be Compelling Circumstances
Where the Movant Need Only Show Serious Questions
Winter and most other recent Supreme Court precedents quite
clearly support a sequential test that requires the movant to
demonstrate likely success on the merits. In order to allow judges and
litigants appropriate flexibility, however, the Supreme Court should
carve out an exception where the serious-questions test, in
combination with an elevated hardship showing (in other words, the
Ninth Circuit's Alliance test), can suffice. A movant should only have
access to this relaxed merits showing when there is some particularly
compelling reason why the movant would have difficulty showing, or
the judge would have difficulty evaluating, the movant's likelihood of
success on the merits. Some situations that might permit the judge
the discretion to use the serious-questions test could include the
following: (1) with respect to factual matters, when the district judge
finds that substantial additional factual development is needed; or (2)
with respect to legal issues, when the question is one of first
impression. These two examples are illustrative of the types of
circumstances that could enable a judge to use the serious-questions
test; they are not intended to constitute a comprehensive list. It is
important that these exceptions remain extremely narrow, however,
or they will swallow the sequential test.
These examples attempt to address some of the factual and
legal circumstances in which the judge may need additional flexibility
because it would be exceptionally difficult to predict the movant's
likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits. If, in certain
extremely compelling circumstances, the judge finds that significant
additional factual development is needed, even after the filing of the
papers and the hearing, the judge should be able to use the seriousquestions standard. Due to factual uncertainties, it may be difficult to

284. This argument may be less true when courts are exercising diversity jurisdiction, so I
have provided for an exception in Part V.B that encompasses diversity suits.
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determine whether the movant is more likely than not to succeed on
the merits, but the judge may still be able to determine that the
movant has raised serious questions going to the merits that justify
further factual development.
Uncertainty about prevailing on the merits may arise not only
from exceptionally complex facts but also from novel questions of law.
For instance, if there is a legal question of first impression that is
central to the preliminary injunction, then the judge should also be
able to use the serious-questions standard if he so chooses. If the
question has not yet been raised in the judge's circuit, then it is even
more difficult for him to predict how the question will be resolved, and
a relaxed merits prong may therefore be appropriate. This approach
confines the use of the serious-questions test to instances where the
legal questions truly are uncommonly difficult. This factor may arise
more frequently when a court is sitting in diversity, because a federal
court may be less likely to have addressed the issue.
If the Supreme Court acknowledged a serious-questions
exception to an overall sequential test, a district judge would need to
make certain findings to justify his use of the serious-questions test.
For instance, if the judge opted to use the serious-questions test
because he was confronting a novel legal issue, then he would have to
explain why the issue was novel in his circuit. Or, if he found that he
needed significant additional factual development, he would need to
describe why the particular factual complexity of the case made him
unable to resolve the merits prong under the sequential test.
Appellate courts review preliminary injunctions under an abuse of
discretion standard, so it is likely that those courts would also review
these findings for abuse of discretion. This gives the district judge
even more discretion, because it will be quite difficult to overturn his
choice to use the serious-questions test. This narrow serious-questions
exception would allow for flexibility where movants and courts truly
need it, but would not suffer from the potential weaknesses of the
Second and Seventh Circuits' serious-questions
approaches:
inconsistent application among judges and the granting of
unwarranted preliminary injunctions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Winter, Munaf, and
Nken have not eased the divisions among the federal circuit courts
regarding the proper preliminary injunction standard. The Fourth
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Circuit has held that Winter requires a sequential test and that Winter
overrules the circuit's own longstanding threshold test.28 5 In contrast,

the Second and Seventh Circuits, and some members of the Ninth
Circuit, have held that their sliding-scale tests survive Winter in some
form.

28 6

The Supreme Court should enunciate a uniform federal
preliminary injunction standard in order to minimize discrepancies
between the circuits and to discourage forum-shopping. In a case
squarely presenting the continued viability of sliding-scale tests, the
Court is likely to affirm the test stated in Winter. In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction under Winter, a movant must demonstrate
each of the following four factors: (1) likely irreparable injury, (2)
likely success on the merits, (3) the balance of the harms tips in the
movant's favor, and (4) the public interest favors a preliminary
injunction. Yet, to give effect to the need for flexibility expressed by a
number of circuit courts, courts should slightly relax this test in
exceptional circumstances. Where additional flexibility is truly
required, the movant should be required to demonstrate only serious
questions going to the merits, combined with a balance of the
hardships that tips sharply in his favor. Courts could determine these
exceptional circumstances by evaluating whether: (1) substantial
additional factual development is needed before the district judge can
confidently determine that the movant is likely to succeed on the
merits; or (2) the district judge faces an important legal question of
first impression.
This sequential test, with a narrowly circumscribed exception,
will promote uniformity and impartiality among federal judges and
should therefore discourage forum-shopping among litigants. This test
is faithful to the history of preliminary injunctions and the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Winter, Munaf, and Nken. A movant will
not be able to manipulate the judicial process to obtain a preliminary
injunction when he has little chance of ultimately prevailing on the
merits of his claim. Yet, this test also offers federal judges some
additional flexibility in extraordinary circumstances, so long as they
make the requisite findings to justify this use of their discretion. A
sequential test with a narrow serious-questions exception provides the

285. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on
other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
286. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' treatment of
their sliding-scale tests after Winter).
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best combination of flexibility and stability and offers the best chance
of consistent, and therefore fair, decisions.
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